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Enduring Change: Confucianism and the 
Prospect of Human Rights * 
Anthony C. Yu 余國藩 
The University of Chicago 
That which is above physical form we call the way; 是故形而上者 
that which is below physical form we call 謂之道，形而 
instrument. That which transforms and regulates 下者謂之器， 
[things] we call change. To deduce [such 化而裁之謂之 
principles] and act on them we call connection. To 變，推而行之 
take up [such principles] and install them among 謂之通，舉而 
the people of the world we call service and 錯之天下之民 
enterprise. 謂之事業 0 
The Classic of Change, "Commentary on the 《易經》〈繋 
Appended Phrases," 1.12 辭〉，1 • 12 
Continuity and Change: A Linguistic Prologue 
Whether there is such a thing as the "essence" or "soul" of China and whether 
it can change over time are hardly idle questions, questions that I 'd like to examine 
on this occasion. Even for a single individual, the questions of the subject and 
personal identity—who am I and in what sense the ' T ' of today is the same as the 
* This essay began as an invited lecture in a year-long lecture series in 1998 on "The Souls 
of Nations and the Prospect for Democracy" sponsored by the John M. Olin Center for 
Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy at The University of Chicago. I 
acknowledge with gratitude the generosity and kindness of my colleagues, Professors 
Nathan Tarcov and Joseph Cropsey, directors of the Center. The essay has also benefited 
from the discerning comments of my colleagues and friends—Professors Alan Gewirth, 
Jean Beth Elshtain, Franklin Gamwell, Bruce Lincoln, Victor Mair, Henry Rosemont, and 
Lisa Raphals. 
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"I" of yesterday—are questions of great complexity and much discussion � . T o 
extend such a discussion to the most populous nation on earth (its on site population 
now est imated to be nearly 1.3 bil l ion, with several hundred mil l ions more in 
d iaspora) may seem a hope less ly qu ixo t ic and ben igh ted under tak ing , not to 
mention an arrogant exercise in writing essentialism despised by many quarters of 
contemporary scholarship. Nevertheless, to study the subject that I have assigned 
myself, I find I cannot avoid treating the difficult topic of cultural identity and the 
prospect for change. 
To note the difficulty inherent in my project does not mean that students of 
China have been reluctant to debate the peculiar or distinctive characteristics of that 
civilization. Indeed, throughout the long course of China ' s existence, interested 
observers both past and present, both native and foreign, have not been hesitant in 
making pronouncements about that culture's spirit and content—declarations that 
are most affirmative or most critical, wildly errant or astutely percipient. How to 
adjudicate between markedly conflicting visions or "sightings" (as Jonathan Spence 
[1936- ] calls them in his 1998 book, The Chan's Great Continent: China in 
Western Mind) r egard ing any reputedly de f in ing fea tu re of Ch ina is not only 
hazardous, but as it is often the case, the decision must also turn on further debate 
and interpretat ion. "Our unders tanding of Chineseness , " according to the wise 
suggestion of historian Wang Gungwu 王賡武 ( 1 9 3 0 - ) for some sort of guiding 
p r i n c i p l e f o r the e n d e a v o r , " m u s t r e c o g n i z e the f o l l o w i n g : it is l iv ing and 
changeable; it is also the product of a shared historical experience whose record has 
cont inual ly inf luenced its growth; it has become increasingly a se l f -consc ious 
matter for China; and it should be related to what appears to be, or to have been 
Chinese in the eyes of the non-Chinese"121. 
The history of Western sinology as a whole, in this light of Wang ' s remark, 
can—and must—be understood as one long process of encounter wherein discovery 
has been constantly commingled with reaction and evaluation. From Marco Polo's 
(ca. 1254-1324) rhapsodic report of old Cathay 's material riches and architectural 
111 See, for example, Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, translated by Kathleen Blarney 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
121 Wang Gungwu, The Chineseness of China: Selected Essays (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 2. 
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o p u l e n c e , the E n l i g h t e n m e n t ' s ma rve l at C o n f u c i a n tex ts , p h i l o s o p h y , and 
bureaucracy, through early European exaltation of Chinese as possibly an "edenic" 
language, Hegel ' s denigration of Chinese history and Bertrand Russel l ' s (1872-
1970) captious remarks about "effeminate and cowardly behavior," to Charles de 
Gaulle (1890-1970), Richard Nixon (1913-1994), and Henry Kissinger's ( 1 9 2 3 - ) 
reports of their audiences with Mao Zedong (1893-1976)，the encyclopedic charting 
and survey of science and technology in Chinese civilization by the late Joseph 
Needham and colleagues, and the equally voluminous and collaborative writing of 
The Cambridge History of China, the West of the last five hundred years has sifted 
and scrutinized the "Middle Kingdom" relentlessly131. Virtually all salient aspects of 
historical and modern Chinese culture — language, behavior, social organization 
and kinship structure, religion, politics, finance, population, books and printing, the 
healing arts (to name a few that come readily to mind) 一 have been studied with 
increasing sophistication and intensity. In this century more than ever, the passion 
for knowledge about China has been fueled by historical circumstances, political 
necessity, and the advance in technology. Such knowledge, however, has less of an 
� A convenient summary of this history is found in Jonathan Spence, "Western Perceptions 
of China from the Late Sixteenth Century to the Present," in Paul S. Ropp, ed., Heritage 
of China: Contemporary Perspectives on Chinese Civilization (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), pp. 1-14. A longer account will be found in Jerome Ch'en P柬志 
讓，China and the West: Society and Culture 1815-1937 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1979). For accounts of various aspects of the discovery and reception of 
China in the West, see such studies as J Bouvet, Histoire de Vempereur de la Chine 
(Paris: 1699); David E. Mungello, Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins 
of Sinology (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1985); Knud Lundbaek, T. S. 
Bayer (1694-1738): Pioneer Sinologist, Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies 
Monograph Series No. 54 (London: Curzon Press, 1986); Knud Lundbaek, Joseph de 
Premare (1666-1736)，S.J.: Chinese Philology and Figurism, Acta Jutlandica LXVI: 2, 
Humanities Series 65 (Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1991); Umberto Eco, The 
Search for the Perfect Language, translated by James Fentress (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995)， 
Chap. 7; G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree (New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc., 1956)，pp. 111-38; Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China 
(New York: The Century Co., 1922). For a recent and brilliant discussion of the perils and 
possibilities of cross-cultural understanding, see Zhang Longxi 張隆漢，Mighty 
Opposites: From Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998)，Chap. 1，"The Myth of the 
Other." 
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unchanging reality as its object than an historical exper ience that is constantly 
subject to modification by anticipated or unexpected forces of change. 
Take, for example the matter of the Chinese language which, particularly in its 
scr iptural fo rm, may cer ta inly be cons idered an endur ing beques t of Ch inese 
cul ture. En joy ing a virtually unparal le led history of longevi ty and cont inuous 
development over several thousand years, the language has exerted incalculable 
in f luence on every m a j o r aspect of Ch inese c ivi l iza t ion 丨4|. "Tha t was clear ly 
Ch inese by [the t ime of the f i rs t mi l l enn ium be fo re the c o m m o n era] fo r the 
Chinese," writes Wang Gungwu, "was their language of signs and symbols. It had 
overcome the limitations of speech and hearing and had united peoples who could 
not have u n d e r s t o o d each o t h e r w i s e " l5]. W h a t is e n d u r i n g , h o w e v e r , is not 
synonymous with the unchanging, because the technological advance in the form of 
the personal computer during the last 
and dissemination of Chinese that is 
fac i l i t a t ion of r e p r o d u c i n g the non-
;decade has wrought a revolution in the use 
；wholly without precedent . The compute r ' s 
- a lphabe t C h i n e s e scr ip t has m o v e d f r o m 
laborious techniques of "translating" stroke-based constructions of Chinese graphs 
onto the alphabet-based keyboard, through break-through designs of graphic type-
setting and storage coordinated with different systems of romanization (Wade-Giles 
and Pinyin fo r Manda r in , and more recent ly , m a j o r C h i n e s e d ia lec ts such as 
Cantonese, Hakka, and Taiwanese), to stylus or even voice-activated input for direct 
representation. As far as the keyboard is concerned, the massive utilization of a 
romanized system of representation has meant, first of all, another giant step in the 
globalization of the modern English alphabet, because the keyboard built on these 
141 See, for example, Jerry Norman, Chinese (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988)，p. 1: "Few language names are as all-encompassing as that of Chinese. It is made 
to serve at once for the archaic inscriptions of the oracle bones, the literary language of 
the Zhou dynasty sages, the language of Tang and Song poetry and the early vernacular 
language of the classical novels, as well as the modern language in both its standard and 
dialectal forms." Also Christoph Harbsmeier in Joseph Needham, ed., Science and 
Civilisation in China, Vol. 7 Pt. 1，Language and Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998)，p. xxi: "There is only one culture in the world which has 
developed systematic logical definitions and reflections on its own and on the basis of 
non-Indo European language. This is the Chinese culture. The history of logical reflection 
in China is therefore of extraordinary interest for any global history of logic and hence for 
any global history of the foundations of science." 
151 Wang Gungwu, Chineseness, p. 3. 
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twenty-six letters is now used by hundreds of millions of people, who themselves 
may know little or no English, to reproduce nonetheless effectively the Chinese 
script and, thus, to communicate in written Chinese. 
For native and foreign users alike, the computer's alphabetical keyboard has 
perhaps unintentionally abetted the language reform measures pioneered by the 
PRC when it first introduced the Pinyin system. This schematization that has been 
severely criticized and resisted (myself included) has suddenly been transformed 
into a virtually universal practice, for assisted by the computer, what it has 
succeeded in doing more than government policy is to provide an irresistible linkage 
between script and sound, through the enforced adoption of an alphabetical 
syllabary. For the first time in their long history, the users of the Chinese language 
are compelled to confront a phonological method of comprehending, retaining, and 
reproducing their language; that is, to match script to phonological representations 
that are completely conventionalized, hence standardized. In its function, the Pinyin 
system is exactly the same as the Guoyu zhuyin fuhao 國語注音符號 (Phone t ic 
Symbols of the National Language [Mandarin]) introduced in 1918. Whereas those 
symbols, however, are still constructed variations or simplified versions of Chinese 
graphs, the Pinyin system is fashioned entirely by the English alphabet. This is the 
crucial difference. Although the alphabetization of Chinese phonemes by the PRC 
reformers was at first intended primarily for facilitating uniformed vocalization and 
easy comprehension, the introduction of the computer changes the picture radically 
by joining this phonetic representation of the language to the effective reproduction 
of the script. Pinyin not merely grants immediate utility to the keyboard, but it also 
directly assimilates into the language一and thus domesticates一symbolic elements 
once thought to be completely alien |6!. 
161 During a brief tour of China in 1987,1 was astonished to discover that virtually all of the 
street names of a huge city like Shanghai had signs written only in Pinyin. Unaware of 
my own ignorance, I asked my university guide why no Chinese characters were visible 
on the signs. Pointing to the English alphabets, my guide bellowed: "These are Chinese 
signs!" In Taiwan, decades of chaotic romanization may now finally be brought under 
control. The Central Daily News 中央日報(overseas edition), July 27, 1999, p. 4 
announced the decision by the Conference on Educational Reform convened by the 
Executive Yuan to recommend standardizing romanization of all street road names of the 
island with the Pinyin system. If implemented, needless to say, such a move would go a 
long way in further unifying the phonetic symbolization of the Chinese script, even 
though the proposed policy exempts personal names from this system of representation. 
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One not ful ly understood consequence of this development is precisely this 
necessity of thinking phonetically when using the computer. Whereas in the pre-
computer days a person writing in Chinese might well have reproduced a number of 
graphs on the page without knowing their precise or "correct" vocalization in the 
d o m i n a n t ve rnacu la r , and this s i tua t ion app l ies to even the c l u m s y C h i n e s e 
typewriters, the current student taught to be reliant on the alphabet keyboard and a 
particular phonological system of representation in principle must master the proper 
phonemes that delimit the range of this individual 's working vocabulary. Wrong 
pronuncia t ion or misvocal iza t ion while using a compute r may mean comple te 
s toppage of wri t ing until the correct sound (i.e. correct ly spelled phoneme) is 
ascertained. With this critical constraint, not only a tradition of several thousand 
years in acqu i r ing , r e t a in ing , and r e p r o d u c i n g a g r a p h i c — h e n c e es sen t i a l ly 
imagistic (Fennollosa and Ezra Pound were both right and wrong!)—language has 
been drastically modified, but the very nature of that language itself may have been 
irreversibly altered. Since keyboard 'usage enforces strict reliance on mastery of a 
particular dialectal form of the language, "The limitations of speech and hearing" 
—Wang Gungwu's phrase quoted earlier—are reimposed to a significant degree in 
the communicative process. On the other hand, the global familiarity of the English 
alphabet and the speed of the computer join to provide unprecedented rapidity in the 
use and dissemination of the Chinese script. 
Seen in this l ight, what the P R C began as a p rog rammat i c r e fo rm to help 
educate its vast population by opting to adopt Pinyin, a syllabary constructed out of 
the Engl i sh let ters , is now i m m e a s u r a b l y a ided and m a d e i r revers ib le by the 
computer, for in its global use a resolutely non-alphabetical language has forever 
been a lphabet ized at least in its vocal ized mode . Conf ron ted by the recurr ing 
phenomenon on the computer that the phoneme ma may actually betoken 18 graphs 
and as many or even more meanings, the student may be lead by habit to valorize a 
sonic unit constructed in an alphabetical syllabary as a sort of stable, if not superior, 
semantic unit over against the individualized characters. In this way, the computer 
a lso i ron ica l ly ass is t s the o the r sa l ien t p l ank of the P R C ' s l ingu is t i c r e f o r m 
platform, for the composition of the Chinese word (traditionally made up of both 
logographic and, frequently, phonographic elements) now becomes correspondingly 
less important. The PRC's systematic proposal to simplify the graphic complexity of 
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the characters and to promote, whenever context allows, the interchangeable use of 
homonyms is thus undeniably a logical extension of the decision to privilege sound 
and speaking over the writing system[7] . Whether this kind of development must 
eventuate in the gross distortion and impoverishment of the Chinese language, as 
many critics once charge, and how will it affect the long-term preservation and 
modif ica t ion of Chinese , are quest ions not re levant to the present inquiry. 
Nevertheless one paradox—the changeability of the culturally permanent—has 
become certain, for language as part of the quintessentially Chinese, because of the 
computer, has been touched and transformed by some element essentially foreign 
and alien. The non-Indo-European has become in part Indo-European. 
Is this kind of deve lopment also poss ib le in other domains of Chinese 
civilization, part of the Chinese "soul" ？ This is the question underlying the 
remaining portions of my essay when I turn to explore the perennially controversial 
issue of individual vs. community or group in Chinese, and the issue will be 
focalized here as an examination of classical Confucianism and its compatibility 
with the modern advocacy of human rights. I have chosen to frame my inquiry 
along this line not merely because, as one scholar has put the matter, "the problem 
of human r ights lies at the heart of modern poli t ical d i scourse" 181. Just as 
importantly, the discussion of the individual's role and significance in Chinese 
culture inevitably encroaches on the central tenets of Confucian ethics and politics. 
For more than two millennia, the powerful and pervasive ideology sustaining 
丨71 I have noticed an increased tendency in myself, in colleagues and students, and even 
occasionally in Hong Kong and Taiwan journalism to use the "wrong" homonyms, 
typographical errors most likely generated by computer-based word-processing or type-
setting. For an eloquent but somewhat uncritical eulogy of the alphabet, see Ivan Illich, In 
the Vineyard of the Text, A Commentary to Hugh's "Didascalicon“ (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 39-40: ". . . the alphabet is an elegant technology 
for the visualization of sounds. Its two dozen shapes trigger the memory of utterances that 
have been articulated by the mouth, the tongue, or the lips, and filter out what is said by 
gesture, mime, or the guts. Unlike other writing systems, it records sounds, not ideas. And 
in this it is foolproof: readers can be trained飞o voice things which they have never heard 
before. This much the alphabet has done, and with incomparable efficiency, for the last 
two millennia." In this and other passages, Illich has taken ancient Cratylism to new 
heights. 
181 Ann Kent, Between Freedom and Subsistence: China and Human Rights (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 5. 
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imperial governance, kinship structures, social values, familial morality, and the 
formal educational system has been irrefutably Confucian. This cultural dominance 
has cast its long shadow even into contemporary China, as a passing journalistic 
remark today can still refer , jus t ly , to C o n f u c i a n i s m and C o m m u n i s m as that 
nat ion 's "sustaining (albeit col lapsing) value sys tems" 191. Abroad the tradition 
continues its influence on diaspora Chinese communities the world over. Even more 
impressively, attempts in the rehabilitation and retrieval of the Confucian tradition, 
among certain educated elites enjoying also apparent support f rom state and local 
governments, have been steadily escalating in China itself during the post-Mao era 
that began in the seventies. Witness the series of conferences devoted to Confucius 
and his t e a c h i n g s tha t w e r e he ld in H a n g z h o u , 1980, in B e i j i n g , 1989 (an 
international symposium to celebrate the sage's 2,540th birthday anniversary), and 
again in Beijing, 1994，during which gathering Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew 李光耀 
(1923- ) was the keynote speaker. On September 26, 1999, the celebration for the 
2,550th birthday anniversary was held with great fanfare at Confucius ' s birthplace, 
Qufu 曲阜 of Shandong Province, and it coincided with the completion of the first 
phase of construction of a sizeable Research Institute of Confucius 孑L子研究院 _ . 
An exercise such as the one I ' m trying to conduct here, therefore, cannot avoid 
querying the persistent relevance of this tradition for Chinese communities looking 
toward the next millennium. 
The Weight of Ancestors 
In his t h o u g h t f u l essay s ign i f i can t ly t i t led, "Ear ly C iv i l i za t ion in Ch ina : 
Ref lec t ions on H o w It B e c a m e Ch inese" | l l ], historian David N. Keight ley has 
enumerated many factors during the time of the Neolithic to the early imperial age 
that he lped to a n s w e r his t i tu lar ques t ion . T h e s e inc lude : h ie ra rch ica l socia l 
distinctions, massive mobilization of labor, an emphasis on ritual in all dimensions 
of life including the early institutionalization of ancestor worship, an emphasis on 
formal boundaries and models, an ethic of service, obligation, and emulation, little 
191 The New York Times, Wednesday, November 17，1999, A15. 
|l0] See Shijie ribao 世界日報，Monday, September 27，1999, p. 2. 
""David N. Keightley, "Early Civilization in China: How It Became Chinese," in Paul S. 
Ropp, ed.，Heritage of China, pp. 15-54. 
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sense of tragedy or irony, the lack of significant foreign invasions, and the absence 
of any pluralistic national traditions[12]. Another distinctive aspect of early Chinese 
civilization, "an emphasis on the group rather than the individual," finds striking 
i l lustrat ion in Keigh t ley ' s compar ison of a f i f th century kylix vase by the 
Penthesileia Painter with a hu wine vase dated to the Eastern Zhou period (late sixth 
to fifth century BCE). Whereas the lone figures of Achilles and the Amazon queen 
occupy virtually the entire surface of the Greek vase, the decor of the Chinese 
vessel displays scenes of group activities-—battles by land and sea, banquets, 
hunting, and the picking of mulberry leaves. Because these scenes are "stereotypical 
silhouettes" of nameless hordes, "the overwhelming impression conveyed by these 
tableaux is one of contemporaneous, regimented, mass activity" ll3]. 
This treatment of early Greek civilization by Keightley, to be sure, is vulnerable 
to criticism because he has concentrated exclusively on one depiction of archaic 
heroism and ignores completely both geometric pottery and the all-important 
implications of polis (city) and domos (house) that have been present even in 
Homeric epics, not to mention later philosophers, dramatists, and historians. 
Whatever decorative motif that might have been preferred by early Greek pottery, a 
culture showing little concern for communitarian values, however defined, could 
hardly be expected to produce Plato 's Republic, Thucydides ' s History of the 
Pelopennesian War, and Aristotle's Politics. 
On the other hand, Keightley's observation about the prevalence of the group 
already manifest in early China seems to me to be keen and unerring. Once more, 
however, iconographic suggestiveness needs to be enhanced and particularized by 
verbal artifacts. From preserved material inscriptions of the Neolithic to the formal 
writings of the early Han, a culture that displays so voluminous a record and so 
large a vocabulary of ancestral gradation and ranking, l ineage, and kinship 
structures must be, even on a prima facie basis, interested in the life in and of the 
group. Similarly, the documents on rituals all center on court, clan, and household 
duties and activities, and they hardly qualify as prescriptions for personal ethics or 
individual behavior [14). Ritual events inscribed on bronze vessels, ritual behavior 
1121 David N. Keightley, "Early Civilization in China," pp. 31，48-53. 
"3] David N. Keightley, "Early Civilization in China," p. 17. 
"4| The classic work of modern scholarship that links decisively early Chinese kinship 
system to ritual performance is, of course, Claude Levy-Strauss, The Elementary 
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attributed to a practitioner like Confucius (e.g., Analects 10)，and ritual patterns 
codi f ied in var ious classic texts (Zhou Li 周禮，Yi Li 儀禮，Lij i 禮記）are not 
writings intended to induce proper behavior based on sound knowledge and critical 
judgement of a single individual (note " E K a a x o Q , the starting point of Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics (1094a26-1095a 12). They provide, rather, the purpose and 
plan of action already selected, established, and judged as worthy of persons or 
various kinds of person, the meaning of whose very existence is at the same time 
unalterably defined by their social status. Just as it is unthinkable for the ordinary 
plebian to behave like a minister, for that would indicate inordinate insolence, so a 
father is considered perverse if he engages in actions deemed appropriate only for 
his children, a sure sign of moral weakness. It is the recognition of this feature of 
ancient Chinese society, in fact, that must presuppose any discussion of the relations 
of the individual to the group by Confucius and followers, a period that spans the 
sixth century to the common era. 
In a well-known passage when Duke Jing of the state of Qi asked the Master 
about government, 
Confucius answered, "let the ruler be a ruler, the subject a subject, the 
father a father, the son a son." 
The Duke said, "Splendid! Truly, if the ruler be not a ruler, the 
subject not a subject, the father not a father, the son not a son, then even 
if there be grain, would I get to eat it." 1151 
The marvelous feature of this dialogue is its purposive opacity. Neither the sage nor 
his interlocutor feels obliged to explain what letting a subject be a subject means, 
although subsequent Confucian disciples and commentators show little hesitancy in 
Structures of Kinship, revised and translated by James Harle Bell, et al. (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1969)，pp. 311-392. It is another irony of Chinese history that owing to rapid 
modernization, dual career families (conditions obtaining both in China and in Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and other diaspora Chinese communities), and the one-child policy 
officially implemented in 1981 on the mainland, the massive vocabulary of extended kin 
relations may become progressively lost to children of current and future generations. 
,l5) Confucius, The Analects, translated by D. C. Lau .fij殿爵(Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1992)，XII，11，p. 113. 
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spelling out what they would consider the proper implications of these terse, laconic 
exhortations. In the immediate context of the anecdote, however, both men seem to 
know exactly well beforehand the practical content implied in Confucius's dicta no 
less than the serious consequences of the success or failure of action on the part of 
persons thus classified. The punch clause of the Duke's utterance is especially 
illuminating in this regard, for the force of his rhetorical question is premised on his 
belief (and by extension, his listener's as well) that agricultural success ( "if there be 
grain" ) can guarantee neither biological gratification (a human like him must eat) 
nor entitled benefit (as ruler and father, he might expect filial sharing of food from 
sons or tributes of grain from subjects). Rather, the Duke's enjoyment of sustenance 
in the taxonomic ideal depends on each differentiated class of persons in the social 
order, including the Duke himself, fulfilling the unspecified but understood moral 
obligations. 
There should be no mistake, however, that the implied rank and status of the 
persons thus classified already express concretely a set of unequal relations. In the 
biological realm, the son within the context of his own household may eventually 
attain the rank and status of a father. In the political sphere, on the other hand, the 
subject, unless he happens to be one who eventually overthrows the ruler, will likely 
remain forever a subject . It is the asymmetry of such relat ions, later to be 
permanently codified by Confucian disciples into the so-called Five or even Ten 
Relations (wu lun 五 shi lun 十儉)，that makes the meaning of the individual 
person in tradit ional Chinese culture not easily reconci lable with the basic 
presuppositions informing the Western discourse on human and civil rights. 
If one were to pose at this junc ture the quest ion as to what is the most 
significant and representative feature of Chinese social thought that has endured 
through the centuries, my own reply would point to the intimate homology that 
countless writers and thinkers have drawn between the state (guo 國）and the family 
(Jia 家）.Furthermore, the single social practice that of fers both compell ing 
illustration and underpinning of such a homology is also one that has rendered 
Chinese culture extremely distinctive, if not entirely unique, in the long course of its 
history. Long antedating the time of Confucius, ancestor worship has found ample 
documentation in the Shang oracle bones inscriptions. This familiar cultural practice 
within the affairs of the Shang state played a "central, institutionalized role" 
because, as Keightley has astutely observed, it "promoted the dead to higher levels 
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of authority and impersonali ty with the passage of generations, encouraged the 
genesis of hierarchical, protobureaucratic conceptions and that it enhanced the value 
of these conceptions as more secular forms of government replaced the Bronze Age 
theocracy" ll6]. 
The decisive contribution of Shang ancestral worship was precisely this union in 
itself of the three realms of power that determine and constrain human existence: 
the sacral, the biological, and the political. In contrast to the Greek concern for 
ques t ions of or igins , " f i rs t causes , " or " f i rs t p r inc ip les , " the more social and 
biological concept ion of identi ty among the Chinese , says Keight ley, led to a 
corresponding concern for "genealogy and history. A hierarchy of ancestors leading 
back to a dimly perceived founding ancestor or ancestress was answer enough 
because it satisfied the kinds of quest ions that were being asked" 1 丨7|. Al though 
classic Chinese texts did not raise the questions of origin or first cause in the same 
abstract manner as those of Greek antiquity, there should be no doubt that the name 
and status of ances tor be long to the realm of the sacred, because their act of 
procreation was thought to possess primordial significance. Keightley's insight is, in 
fact, conf i rmed by a passage in the section on "Special Livestock for Suburban 
Sacr i f ice (Jiaotesheng 交P 特牲），，in the Han anthology Record of Rites, which 
declares that because "all things originate f rom Heaven [and] humans originate 
f rom the ancestor, this is why one offers food and drink to the Exalted Di. The 
S u b u r b a n S a c r i f i c e m a g n i f i e s the r e p a y m e n t of or ig in and the re turn to the 
b e g i n n i n g 萬物本乎天，人本乎祖，此所以配上帝也。郊之祭也，大報本反始 
也’’【181. 
Notice that this statement aligns Di ( H e a v e n )帝 and ancestor all in a continuum 
of power, and this power is by definition religious or sacral because it has to do with 
1,61 David N. Keightley, "Early Civilization in China," p. 31. 
1,71 David N. Keightley, "Early Civilization in China," p. 35. 
【丨81 D. C. Lau and Chen Fong Ching 陳方正’ ed., Liji zhuzi suoyin 禮記逐字索引 (Hong 
Kong: The Commercial Press, 1992)，11.20, p. 71. Among the many formal sacrifices 
associated with the state and the ruler, according to Han's scholar Dong Zhongshu 董 j中 
舒 (179 B.C.-104 B.C.), "none is more important than the Suburban Sacrifice 莫重乎 
郊)’’ see his Chunqiu fanlu 春秋繁露(Sibu beiyao, hereafter SBBY) 15. 7a. For further 
discussion of this rite, see Xu Zhuoyun 許倬雲(Hsii Cho-yun), "Xian Qin zhuzi dui tian 
di kanfa 先秦諸子對天的看法，” in Xu Zhuoyun, Qiu gu bian 求古編(Taipei: Lianjing 
chuban shiye gongsi, 1982)，pp. 427-429. 
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one's ultimate origin, the arche of the individual and the community. To dishonor or 
betray one 's parents and ancestors is to spurn or transgress one 's origin |19). 
Conversely, because ancestors and Heaven are functional equals in this formula, the 
sacral significance of parents is enormous, for they are always on their way to 
becoming ancestors (zu 袓）.Hence filial acts, as acts of "repayment of origin and 
return to origin," are always sanctioned by Heaven, whereas a statement such as 
that by Jesus in Matthew 10:34ff. on the cost of discipleship becomes virtually 
incomprehensible to this day for many Chinese 1201. 
Although the date of the Liji (Record of Rites) as a Han anthology, incontestably 
and thoroughly Confucian in its outlook and authorship, may be separated from the 
Shang period by close to a thousand years, the interpretation of the royal sacrifice 
and its reference to shangdi 上帝 may well have articulated an archaic ideal that 
would far outlive its initial, genetic impact to shape and influence subsequently vast 
stretches of imperial culture. Keightley's words from another source must be cited 
one more time: 
Shang religion was inextricably involved in the genesis and legitimation 
of the Shang state. It was believed that Ti [Di], the high god, conferred 
fruitful harvest and divine assistance in battle, that the king's ancestors 
were able to intercede with Ti, and that the king could communicate 
with his ancestors. Worship of the Shang ancestors, therefore, provided 
powerful psychological and ideological support for the poli t ical 
dominance of the Shang kings. The king's ability to determine through 
divination, and influence through prayer and sacrifice, the will of the 
ancestral spirits legitimized the concentration of political power in his 
"l)| For this reason the most dreaded form of punishment, developed later for the most severe 
offence against family and clan and administered by the community and not by the 
government, is the removal of one's name from the ancestral shrine (e.g., the scene in the 
contemporary film Ju Dou 菊豆). 
12111 "Do you think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, 
but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her 
mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and man's foes will be those of 
his own household. He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and 
he who loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me; and he who does not 
take his cross and follow me is not worthy of me" (Revised Standard Version). 
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person. All power emanated from the theocrat because he was the 
channel, "the one man," who could appeal for the ancestral blessings, 
or dissipate the ancestral curses, which affected the commonality.1211 
Keightley's observation calls attention to the pivotal role of the political leader 
or sovereign in mediating religious meaning and participation in religious activities 
as an integral funct ion of his polit ical authority. Such a func t ion , we must 
emphasize, has remained constant in all of Chinese imperial history, for the emperor 
or sovereign was never exempted from the duty to offer appropriate sacrifices, to 
ancestors and to other related transcendent powers variously conceived, that were 
deemed crucial for the state's health and well-being. 
The most significant development in respect to the union of religion, politics, 
and kinship structures in China's imperial history一the phenomenon which some 
scholars have termed "institutionally diffuse religion" 1221—came at the moment 
when the first emperor of China took for his dynastic title the name of Qin 
Shihuangdi 秦始皇帝 or the First August Emperor of Qin in 221 BCE. The word 
for emperor here is indeed di 帝，frequently translated as God in the scholarship on 
Shang religion and chosen by Mateo Ricci (1552-1610) centuries later as the 
appropriate nomenclature for the Christian deity. Vatican rejection in the Rites 
controversy led to Ricci's eventual choice of the term tianz.hu 天主，but di was 
revived by Protestant missionaries in the nineteenth century, and the term shangdi 
since has existed for nearly two centuries in their biblical translation as an accepted 
name for God. Even more significantly for our discussion here is the fact that the 
term di may, as a number of scholars have argued, etymologically connote the sense 
of ancestor |23). When, therefore, the first emperor who united China assumed this 
1211 David N. Keightley, "The Religious Commitment: Shang Theology and the Genesis of 
Chinese Political Culture," History of Religions, 17: 3.4 (Feb. - May 1978)，pp.212-213. 
1221 See, for example, C. K. Yang 楊黢望,Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of 
Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of their Historical Factors 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); Robert P. Weller, Unities and Diversities 
in Chinese Religion (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987). 
1231 For a succinct argument based on thorough review of pertinent scholarship, see Robert 
Eno, "was There a High God Ti in Shang Religion," Early China, 15 (1990), pp. 1-26; 
and also Xu Zhuoyun, Xi Zhou shi 西周史(Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1984), 
pp. 95-106. For a dissenting and somewhat reactionary view, see Xu Fuguan 徐復觀， 
Zhongguo sixiangshi lunji xubian 中國思想史論續篇（Taipei: Shibao chubanshe, 1982), 
pp. 239-244. 
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title for himself, that single name would weave together in itself the related strands 
of Chinese conceptions of transcendent origin, paternity, authority, and power. 
As if fearing that this single term would be insufficient to make apparent the 
symbolic significance of the ruler, the word zu, a much more common term for 
ancestor, was incorporated into the dynastic title of the first emperor of the Han. 
Henceforth, in the different appellations of individual reigns since 206 BCE, the 
ruler named as di or zu could mean quite literally that the ruler was a "god of 
martial prowess (wudi 武帝)’’ or "high ancestor (gaozu 高祖)’，，as many of them 
were called. Still later in the opening years of the Tang, the dynastic title of the 
second emperor was established as taizong 太宗 or supreme ancestor. With this 
string of names forever canonized in the official annals of imperial history, as one 
can see, transcendence has been nominally immanentalized and made familiar as 
kin, but such appellations also purport to indicate unambiguously that the ruler's 
power and authority remain godlike and, therefore, absolute. Moreover, they are 
meant to facilitate the venerable understanding obtaining even in Confucius's time 
that between state and family there exists a complete and practicable homology 1241. 
If the ruler, king, or emperor is, in fact, the grand ancestor of his subjects, political 
virtues must find their expression in kinship terms, much as the household patriarch 
will be enabled by such discursive propping to rule with impunity as god and ruler 
within his family and clan. 
The Homology of Virtues 
To be fair to the historical Confucius (551-479 BCE), his teachings have little to 
say about ancestors as such, but we must remember as well that they never dispute 
the important necessity of sacrifices (ji 祭)’ including those established for ancestors 
(e.g.，Analects 2. 5, 24). Although there are only a few remarks about parents {fumu 
父母)and father scattered throughout the Analects, it cannot be denied that his 
observations on filial piety (xiao 孝）in conjunction with how to serve one's parents 
(s hi fumu 事父母：e.g., Analects 1. 7; 4. 18) and how to serve one's ruler (shijun 事 
124丨 I use this term in a sense analogous to how it is used in the biological sciences: structural 
similarity of two parts of one organism based on a common developmental origin. 
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君：Analects 1. 7; 3. 18-19; 11. 12; 14. 22) are more abundant throughout his 
collected sayings. Significant in this regard is the homologous relationship already 
drawn by Confucius between service to one 's family and that to the state. When 
queried by someone why he was not taking part in government, Confucius replied: 
"The Book of History says, ‘Oh! Simply by being a good son and 
friendly to his brothers a man can exert an influence upon government. ' 
In so doing a man is, in fact, taking part in government. How can there 
by any question of his having actively to ' take part in government '?" 1251 
Herein lies the seed for his famous doctrine adumbrated in the Great Learning 
that the state's proper governance (zhi guo 治國 ) m u s t be a direct consequence of 
one 's success in regulating one's family (qi jia 齊家）and the cultivation of oneself 
(xiu shen 修身）.The putative commentary on this doctrine by his disciple Zeng 
Shen 曾參，with a pointed allusion to the Analects text cited above, makes the 
connection even more taut and explicit: 
What is meant by "in order rightly to govern the State, it is necessary 
first to regulate the family," is this:—It is not possible for one to teach 
others, while he cannot teach his own family. Therefore, the gentleman, 
without going beyond his household, completes the lessons for the State 
故君子不出家，而成教於國 . T h e r e is f i l ia l p i e t y : — t h e r e w i t h the 
sove re ign shou ld be se rved 孝者，戶斤以事君也 .There is f r a t e rna l 
submission:—therewith elders and superiors should be served. There is 
kindness:一 therewith the multitude should be treated.[261 
This comment indicates clearly the appropriation of an essentially family virtue, 
xiao or filial piety, and its direct application to the political realm, all as part of the 
gradat ion of ethical obl igat ions in accordance with social rankings . In another 
instant, the Han Record of Rites will grandly argue how altruism and administration 
1251 Analects, ii.21，p. 17. 
1261 The Great Learning in James Legge, The Chinese Classics, second revised edition 
(Taipei: Wenshijie chubanshe, 1972, reprint), I: 370. Emphasis added. 
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of justice are directly dependent on the proper filial regard for clan ancestors and 
kin. In the section titled "Grea t Commenta ry (Da zhuan 大傳）” we f ind this 
remarkable summation that deserves full citation: 
Now kinship is the bond of connect ion. Where the starting point is 
a f f e c t i o n , one beg in s wi th the f a t h e r and a scends by rank to the 
ancestor; where the starting point is r ightness, one begins with the 
ancestor and descends in natural order to the deceased father [note how 
hierarchy pr iv i leges the dis tant over the recent] . T h u s the way of 
humans is to love one's parents (shi gu rendao qinqin ye 是故人道親親 
也）.Because one loves o n e ' s pa ren t s , one h o n o r s the a n c e s t o r s ; 
honoring one's ancestors, one also reveres the clan. Because one honors 
the clan, one also keeps together the members of the family branches. 
K e e p i n g t o g e t h e r t h e s e m e m b e r s d i g n i f i e s the a n c e s t r a l s h r i n e ; 
dignifying the ancestral shrine, one attaches great importance to the 
altars of land and grain. Valuing the altars, one therefore loves the 
hundred names [the metaphor for the people], and when one loves the 
people, there will be the accurate administrat ion of punishment and 
penalty. When punishment and penalty are accurate, the ordinary people 
wi l l f i n d s e c u r i t y , and w h e n p e o p l e a re s e c u r e , r e s o u r c e s and 
expenditures will both suffice.1271 
Since the anthology defines the clan as those who share in the patrilineal name 
(tong xing cong zong 同姓從宗） l28], this passage makes plain that the needs and 
a s p i r a t i o n s of the b a s i c f a m i l y un i t , w h e t h e r the k i n g ' s h o u s e h o l d or the 
commoner ' s , must first be satisfied before attention may be directed to other units. 
The crucial turn in this line of argument comes in the somewhat puzzling contention 
that love of people would derive f rom the regard for the altars of land and grain. In 
the context of Confucian writings, however, one point seems evident: altruism is. 
thought to be mot iva t ed pr imar i ly th rough the c o n c e r n s of se l f -p rese rva t ion , 
concretely expressed in the attempt to maintain suff icient sustenance for proper 
1271 Liji, 16.12, p. 92. 
1281 Liji, 16.3，p. 91. 
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sacrifices to one's ancestors. Distributive justice in the Confucian view thus cannot 
be premised on the equal provision of justice for the constituent members of 
society, irrespective of kinship affiliations, because in principle, what is due the 
people (the hundred names or baixing 百姓）is meted out in a centrifugal movement 
from the family or clan as the anchoring unit of that society. If that fundamental unit 
fails in its filial obligations, according to the logic of the passage I cited above, the 
rest of society cannot hope to find security or even the proper administration of 
retributive justice (punishment and penalty). 
Such an understanding of altruism will accord with how the cardinal virtue of 
ren 仁 has been glossed and developed by Confucius and his follower. Antedating, 
in fact, the Confucians, an ancient source like the Classic of Documents already 
hints at the intimate association between ren—a word that has been variously 
rendered in English as benevolence, humaneness, human-heartedness, and even 
sublime generosity of the soul—and virtues valorized in clan rules and ethics 
(zongfa lunli 宗法倫理 ) . In the scribal prayer preserved in the section titled "Metal 
Bond (Jinteng 金縢)’，’ the clause "we are kindly as well as filial (yu ren ruo 
kao=xiao 于仁若考=孝)，’ has been read by a modern authority as "we are obedient 
to the will of our ancestors" 1291. The observation by Fan Wenzi 范文子 recorded in 
the Zuo Commentary also asserts that "not forgetting one's origin is ren 不忘本，仁 
也]” l30». Again, the words of Liji 驪姬 set down in the "Jinyu 晉語” section of the 
Guoyu 國語 declare that "for those who practice benevolence, loving one's parents 
is called ren 為仁者，愛芽見之謂仁” [3". Finally, we have, included with obvious 
approbation in the Analects itself, the statement by the philosopher Youzi 有子 or 
You Ruo 有若 that "being a filial son and an obedient brother is the root of ren 孝弟 
也者，其為仁之本與” 1321. As we shall see momentarily, this conclusion makes sense 
only in the context of the rat ionale s tructured in the entire assert ion of the 
philosopher. 
1291 For the clause, see Qu Wanli 屈萬里 Shangshu jinzhu jinyi 尚書今注今譯(Taipei: The 
Commercial Press, 1969), p. 85. For the reading, see Feng Youlan 馮友蘭，Zhongguo 
zhexueshi xinbian 中國哲學史新編(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), vol. 1, chap. 4. 
1301 See Zuo Commentary 左傳,Duke Cheng 成金，9th year. 
(3,] Guoyu 國語，7. lOa(SBBY). 
1321 Analects, 1. 2. D. C. Lau, following Qian Daxin 錢大昕(1728-1804)，the Qing 
philologian, emends ren 仁 to ren 人.Accordingly, Lau's translation of the last part of the 
statement reads: "the root of a man's character." See The Analect, p. 3. 
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Read together with the declarations cited, the gloss preserved in the Doctrine of 
the Mean, 20, is both illuminating and instructive. “Ren is people," declares the 
text, "but loving one's parents is its greatest [manifestation]人者仁也，親親為大.，’ 
This explicit exegesis provided by the second clause finds repeated and sympathetic 
echoes in someone like Mencius 孟子，who reiterates the same definition in 7A. 15: 
"Loving one's parents is benevolence (亲見孝見，仁也)•，，For him, ren is an affect that 
obtains primarily and most fully between parent and child, in such a special way, in 
fact, that one may regard it as something as natural or decreed (cf. 7B. 24: "the way 
benevolence pertains to the relation between father and son . . . is the Decree, but 
therein also lies human nature 仁之於父子也 命也，有性焉”）.In another 
passage (7A. 45)，Mencius differentiates the proper affect towards kin and non-
relations with this striking gradation: 
Towards l iving crea tures a gent leman would be 
sparing but show them no benevolence; towards the 
people he would show benevolence but not love. 
W h e n he loves his pa ren t s he wou ld show 
benevolence to the people. When he shows people 
benevolence he would be sparing towards the living 
creatures.1331 
君子之於物也， 
愛之而弗仁； 
於民也，仁之 
而弗親。親親 
而仁民，仁民 
而愛物。 
The logic of Mencius and the compilers of the Han anthology on rites, as we can 
see, remains consis tent , because according to them, one cannot even show 
benevolence to the people (ren min) without first loving one's parents (qin qin). 
By what I have called here the homology of virtues, Confucians have insistently 
maintained that the most intimate affect appropriate to a kinship environment (the 
home, the household, the clan) and the ethical action thus motivated are literally and 
equally applicable outside that environment. Since in imperial principle there is no 
space "under Heaven that is not the ruler's territory," the domain of the state both, 
encircles and encompasses the domestic one. United, moreover, in symbolic 
significance in the person of the patriarch are the figures of the sovereign and the 
My translation here follows D. C. Lau's rendering of ai 愛 as sparing. See his Mencius 
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984)，2: 285. 
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father , and it is this equat ion that grants viabil i ty and authori ty to the ethical 
homology. According to the Confucian formula set forth in the Classic of Filial 
Piety (Xiaojing 孝’經)， 
when we take that by which we serve the father to 
serve the mother, the love is the same. When we 
take that by which we serve the father to serve the 
ruler, the reverence is the same. Thus the mother 
t akes o n e ' s love , w h e r e a s the ru le r t akes o n e ' s 
r e v e r e n c e . H e w h o t a k e s b o t h is t he f a t h e r . 
Therefore, when one uses filial piety to serve one 's 
ruler, he will be loyal.1341 
資 於 事 父 以 事 
母，而愛同；資於 
事父以事君，而 
敬同。故母取其 
愛，而君取其敬， 
兼之者，父也。 
故以孝事君，則 
忠 0 
Notice that the logic implied in the above passage is what enables the Confucian 
to posit that the obverse of such prescriptive behavior is equally true: i.e., when one 
serves the ruler with loyalty, the person must be a filial son 故以忠事君，其人必孝. 
It is in the light of such reasoning that one can grasp more fully the powerful 
argument of You Ruo's full assertion preserved so prominently in Analects 1.2: 
For a man who is both filial and obedient as a younger brother, it is rare 
that such a person would love to affront hissuperiors (fan shang 上）. 
In fact, there has never been such a person who, being disinclined to 
affront his superiors, is still fond of inciting a rebellion (zuo luan 作筒L). 
A gentleman works at his roots; once the roots are established, the Way 
will grow therefrom. Are not filial piety and being obedient as a brother 
the roots of humaneness (ren)l 
Filial piety, a practice of personal rectitude, is now decisively recognized for its true 
w o r t h — a n appos i t e mode l fo r publ ic pol i t ical v i r t u e — b e c a u s e its a t t i tudinal 
assumptions and behavioral manifestations (i.e., "the roots" ) can benefit not merely 
parents and kin, but also supremely those in power and authority. 
1341 Lai Yanyuan 賴炎元，and Huang Junlang 黃俊郎，Xinyi Xiaojing duben 新譯孝經讀本 
(Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1992)，p. 31 (chap. 5). 
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The Confucian discourse, moreover, does not emphasize this homology of virtue 
merely to shore up the formulated claims of personal and domestic ethics. In its 
writing the state and history, this line of teaching serves as one linchpin of its 
overall world-regulating (jingshi ,經世）intent and design, as when the phrase qinqin 
is expanded from the basic meaning of loving one's parents to the love or regard for 
one's blood kin within a primarily political context. Witness the pronouncement on 
the defea t of Earl Xi 息侯 by Duke Zheng 鄭伯：among the several causes 
mentioned that would seal the former ' s destruction, the historian-commentator 
included the observation that Xi did not cherish kin relations (bu qinqin), for his 
feuding with Zheng represented a repudiation of the fact that they had the same 
surname 1351. Even in Realpolitik, apparently, the obligations and demands of kinship 
retain their normative force. Why such a construct of human relations conjoining 
ancestry, paternity, rulership and ethics succeeds in such a compelling and lasting 
fashion has been well summarized by a contemporary scholar: 
It was the ancestors who created the human species, and while all 
humans were "born equal," they were "equal" in the sense of being 
equally human and different f rom animals. Moreover, only humans 
could recognize ancestors. Thus ancestors took precedence over nature. 
Thus also filial piety quite rapidly became a core value in the Chinese 
web of interpersonal relationships, an axis liking the individual human 
being, his family, and his society. By the Han dynasty, filial piety had 
already become institutionalized as a criterion for selection of persons 
into officialdom.1361 
In the light of Youzi's observation, that criterion could not be more appropriate! 
The Contemporary Debate 
Certain scholars who would like to reconcile classical Confucian teachings with 
1351 Zuozhuan左傳,Duke Yin隱公，11: “君子是以知息之將亡也……不親親。” 
1361 D- W. Y. Kwok 郭穎頤，"In the Rites and Rights of Being Human," in Wm. Theodore de 
Bary and Tu Weiming, ed., Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998)，p. 85. 
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liberal political thought of the West and the contemporary promotion of human 
rights frequently attempt to do so on the supposed basis that "the true person [in the 
C h i n e s e t r a d i t i o n ] is c o n s t r u e d as a t h o r o u g h l y s o c i a l b e i n g " 丨 . T h i s 
anthropological concept is in turn construed usually as an epitome of the desirable 
emphas i s on moral dut ies and obl iga t ions . For many observers of China , the 
Confucian exaltation of group over individual is not even simply a legacy of a 
single culture. To the extent that historical Confucianism has been a known cultural 
export over the centuries, East and South Asian societies deeply influenced by such 
t ra f f ic are also ind isputab ly impl ica ted . The extent of C o n f u c i a n impac t in a 
particular society, whether as a result of conscious promotion (Korea, Tokugawa 
Japan, contemporary Singapore, Nationalist China on Taiwan) or as lingering habits 
of thought and action in diaspora communit ies, may be variously measured. The 
effect of its undeniable presence, however, has often been praised, for the principal 
emphasis on state and family over the individual person is routinely touted as a core 
e lement of the so-cal led "Asian va lues" that would e f fec t ive ly curb what are 
perceived as the corrosive excesses of Western individualism. In a much quoted 
interview, Lee Kuan Yew declares that 
Eastern societies believe that the individual exists in the context of his 
f ami ly . He is not p r i s t ine and separa te . T h e f ami ly is par t of the 
extended family, and then friends and the wider society. The ruler or the 
government does not try to provide for a person what the family best 
provides.1381 
Sharpening the polemical tone of the debate, Ian Buruma, in his review of the recent 
book by Hong Kong 's last governor, Christopher Patten 彭定康 ( 1 9 4 4 - )，has this 
observation: 
Pat ten 's experience in Hong Kong made him reexamine his political 
instincts. And he concluded that his taste for free market economics, the 
1371 Sumner B. Twiss, "A Constructive Framework for Discussing Confucianism and Human 
Rights," in Confucianism and Human Rights, p. 32. 
1381 Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," Foreign 
Affairs, 73: 2 (March/April 1994)，p. 113. 
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rule of law, and the universality of liberal ideas was more than a matter 
of inst inct . These were big ideas. And the p ropaganda fo r "As ian 
values," putting loyalty to the state above individual liberty, and duty 
and obedience above democrat ic rights, was a chal lenge to the Big 
Ideas: Lee Kuan Yew versus Locke, Mahathir versus Adam Smith. Was 
the "Asian" combination of capitalist economics and authoritarian rule 
exceptional? l39) 
Possible answers to Buruma ' s rhetorical question divide even fur ther those 
scholars interested in accommodating or reconciling the so-called Asian reality with 
both contemporary economics and politics. In the view of Hong Kong's Ambrose 
King 金耀基 ( 1 9 3 5 - ) who thinks that "The East Asian experience demonstrates 
that democracy and modernity are not necessarily inseparable from individualism," 
the ideal would be the deve lopment of a "Democra t ica l ly Confuc i an polit ical 
system or society" in which human rights are to be def ined in "communa l " or 
" s o c i a l " terms1401. For King as fo r o thers sympa the t i c to the accen tua t ion of 
"communitarian" values, the Confucian tradition seems as rich and viable a cultural 
resource for instilling and reinforcing such values. Thus, according to Sumner B. 
Twiss, "human rights in general are compatible in principle not only with cultural 
traditions that emphasize the importance of individuals within community (which is 
a more apt characterization of Western liberalism) but also with cultural traditions 
that may e m p h a s i z e the p r imacy of c o m m u n i t y and the way that ind iv idua l s 
contribute to it一that is, both more liberal individualist and more communitarian 
traditions" [4丨】. 
Such a line of argument dwelling on "communitarian values" and the human 
person as a "social being," regrettably, tends to de-emphasize or overlook the fact 
that in C on fuc i an teachings , d i f ferent social g roups have d i f fe ren t ethical and 
Ian Buruma reviewing Christopher Patten, East and West: China, Power, and the Future . 
of Asia, in The New York Review of Books, 45： 12 (September 1998), p. 18. 
丨,Ambrose C. Y. King, "Confucianism, Modernity and Asian Democracy," in Ron 
Hontekeo and Marietta Stephaniants, ed., Justice and Democracy: Cross-Cultural 
Perspectives (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), pp. 174, 175. 
'4" Sumner B. Twiss, "A Constructive Framework for Discussing Confucianism and Human 
Rights," p. 34. 
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pol i t ical c l a ims on that " soc ia l b e i n g . " It t ends to fo rge t as well that in the 
Confucian state, groups, communities, classes, and stratifications that constitute and 
define all those relations (lun) are no more equal than the individual. On the other 
hand, as one historian in the very first volume of the The Cambridge History of 
China has o b s e r v e d , a l r eady d i s c e r n i b l e a m o n g the t r ends cha rac t e r i s t i c of 
intellectual development f rom the period of the Warring States (403-221 BCE) to 
the Han and beyond would be an "emphasis on the ideal of social harmony, albeit a 
harmony based on inequality. In other words, the emphasis is on the readiness of 
each individual to accept his par t icular place in a s t ructured hierarchy, and to 
perform to the best of his ability the social duties that pertain to that place" 1421. It 
need hardly be said that such an emphasis would find the staunchest support and the 
most eloquent exposition in the Confucian elite, who at every opportunity seems 
ready to draw on the state-family homology to buttress the cardinal principles of 
rulership. Thus in the chapter on "Govern ing the Family (zhijia i台家），’ in his 
pioneering Manual for Family Instruction or Jiaxun 家訓 that became the model for 
count less subsequent imitat ions, the Sui off ic ia l Yan Zhitui 顏之推 ( 5 3 1 - 5 9 1 ) 
bluntly declares, "when the anger expressed by the cane is abolished in one's house, 
the faults of the rebellious son immediately appear. When punishment and penalty 
are inaccurate, the people have no basis even to lift their hands and feet. Leniency 
and severity in governing one 's house are the same as those in the state" 1431. And, 
even if Confuc ius himself did not initiate the practice of ancestor worship, this 
ancient ritual and its correlative ideal of filial piety, as we have seen, were already 
de f t l y a p p r o p r i a t e d by his f i r s t and s econd gene ra t i on d i s c ip l e s as d e c i s i v e 
expressions of domestic propriety, itself deemed indispensable for political order. 
Under the impact of Neo-Confucian revivalism of the Song onward, in fact, the 
ancestral cult and its rituals would not only crowd the pages of the popular genre of 
family instruction manuals , but the design and erect ion of the family shrine, a 
custom increasingly adopted by Song elite officials, would come to dominate even 
1421 Derk Bodde, "The State and Empire of Ch'in," in Denis Twitchett and Michael Loewe, 
ed., The Cambridge History of China, Volume. I: The Ch 'in and Han empires, 221 B.C.-
A.D. 220 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 30. Emphasis added. 
1431 Wang Liqi 王利器，Yanshi jiaxun力y/e 顏氏家訓集解（Beijing: Guji chubanshe, 1980), p. 
54:笞怒廢於家，則豎子之過立見；刑罰不中，則民無所措手足。治家之寬猛，亦猶國 
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domestic architecture as well1441. 
This Confucian insistence on the priority of socio-political relations embedding 
the individual and their immutable claims on that person has not been spared from 
fierce critique by a wide group of Chinese intellectuals early in the twentieth 
century. When one examines, for example, the content of the polemics that made 
famous the early republican iconoclast Chen Duxiu (Ch'en Tu-hsiu 陳獨秀，1879-
1942), one can readily discern that his attack of Confucian ideals and practices was 
based squarely on the charge that they had historically deprived major social groups 
like "sons and wives" of their "personal individuality" and "personal property" [45). 
Although Chen was to become eventually one of the leading theoreticians for the 
Chinese Communis t Party, which succeeded in bui lding probably the most 
totalitarian state known in Chinese history, it should be remembered as well that his 
early contributions to the intellectual ferment of his time stemmed again from the 
conviction, shared by many of the so-called May Fourth thinkers, that the new and 
modern needed in China was a revolutionary discovery and appreciation of the 
individual1461. 
1441 For a recent and stimulating discussion of the "text" of the Chinese house and related 
topics, see Francesca Bray, Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial 
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)，esp. Chaps. 1-3 on "the 
construction of Chinese social space." 
1451 See Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "The Way of Confucius and Modern Life," in Wm. Theodore de 
Bary, Wing-tsit Chan P東榮捷,and Chester Tan 言覃春霜，comp., Sources of Chinese 
Tradition, Vol. II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 153-156. A hint of 
editorial bias is apparent when the introductory notes of this entry declares: "Ch'en 
directs his fire at social customs and abuses which seemed to have Confucian sanction but 
had no place in the modern age" (emphasis mine). To this observation, Hamlet's words to 
his mother may seem an appropriate response: "Seems, madam? Nay, it is, I know not 
seems." As the Columbia editors themselves so meticulously demonstrate in their 
annotations, Ch'en's excerpted essay of no more than three pages [in English translation] 
cites the Record of Rites no less than 17 times and the Yi-li (I-li, Anthology of Propriety 
and Ritual) once for documentation of these "customs and abuses." If more 
documentation is desired, one can simply turn to the bountiful pages of imaginative and 
anecdotal literatures of China's imperial past. 
1461 See Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "The True Meaning of Life," in Sources of Chinese Tradition, pp. 
167-69. For an account of the critique of Confucianism during the early decades of this 
century by Ch'en, Wu Yu, and others, see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: 
Intellectual Revolution in Modern China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1960)，pp. 300-313. 
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Although it is true that there had not been many persons who "declared 
themselves anti-Confucian" resolutely during more than two millennia of Chinese 
imperial history, as Chow Tse-tsung 周策縱（1916- ) has remarked 147), the fortunes 
of Confucianism in the twentieth century, understandably more varied because of 
vast and cataclysmic change, have fluctuated between hostile opposition and 
arduous rehabi l i ta t ion both on the main land and in d iaspora communi t i e s 
elsewhere 1481. The gyrating vicissitudes of Confucian reception in recent Chinese 
experience are thus not only conducive to creating immense historical ironies, but 
those ironies themselves may also betoken the ongoing but halting efforts on the 
part of the Chinese to come to terms with part of their most cherished and stubborn 
cultural legacy. Within the Peoples Republic itself, at times sponsoring not merely 
virulent attacks on the person and ideals of the ancient sage but also brutal attempts 
to uproot virtually all traces of the tradition, there has been nonetheless in the post-
Mao period some movement also to retr ieve and revive a C o n f u c i u s more 
compatible with its own understanding of national modernity. On the other hand, in 
an island nation like Taiwan which prides itself as the keeper and sustainer of 
genuine Confucian values in both government and society1491, the last two decades 
1471 Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement, p. 300. To Chow's observation, however, 
one may also add this rhetorical question: how could the male elite make such a 
declaration when for the most part of that history, the only recourse that men had for a 
vocation of scholastic success, officialdom, and upward mobility was to master the 
Confucian classics? 
1481 See Wang Gungwu, Chineseness, Chaps. 11-12; Jing Wang, High Culture Fever: Politics, 
Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng's China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1996), pp. 64-117. 
1491 See, for example, Emily Martin Ahern, Chinese Ritual and Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Allen Chun, "An Oriental Orientalism: The Paradox 
of Tradition and Modernity in Nationalist Taiwan," History and Anthropology, 9:1 
(1995)，pp.27-56; Huang Huang-ping and Chiu Lian-hwang, "Moral and Civic 
Education," in Douglas C. Smith, ed., The Confucian Continuum: Educational 
Modernization in Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp.367-420; Robert P. Weller, 
Resistance, Chaos, and Control in China: Taiping Rebels, Taiwanese Ghosts, and 
Tiananmen (London: Macmillan, 1994); S. Harrell and C. C. Huang, eds., Cultural 
Change in Postwar Taiwan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 22-46; Ambrose Y. C. 
King, "State Confucianism and Its Transformation: The Restructuring of the State-
Society Relation in Taiwan," and Thomas G. Gold, "Civil Society in Taiwan: The 
Confucian Dimension," both in Tu Wei-ming, ed., Confucian Traditions in East Asian 
Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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have witnessed the f lower ing of str ingent cri t ique, a discourse of ressentiment 
unsparing in both scope and severity against this venerable tradition even as the 
nation strives to become a full-fledged democracy enjoying unprecedented forms of 
freedom. 
A m o n g sinological savants working outs ide of China , there are those who 
w o u l d a d v o c a t e the r e t en t ion and pos s ib ly the r ev iva l of C o n f u c i a n i s m by 
contending that its principal tenets may have even anticipated certain aspects of 
Western l iberal ism and that the Confuc ian insis tence on the priority of socio-
political relat ions embedd ing the individual may not be incompat ib le with the 
Western discourse of human rights. Thus in his thoughtful essay of 1979，Wang 
Gungwu had already anticipated much of the rhetoric and tactics employed by 
contemporary Confucian loyalists by trying to link "the idea of reciprocity" with 
‘‘idea of implicit rights." Adducing from various prescriptions in the Analects, the 
Zuo Commentary, and Mencius for the ideal behavior appropriate to various social 
ranks (e.g., "The ruler should treat the subject with propriety, the subject should 
serve the ruler with loyalty" )，Wang would argue that these duties and obligations 
might well be thought of as a form of rights, in the sense of reciprocal obligations 
categorically demanded of the sovereign, the subject, the father, the son, and the 
spouses | 50]. Similar arguments have also been repeatedly advanced by Tu Weiming 
and Wm. Theodore de Bary. 
According to the latter, the long line of elite officials studding Chinese imperial 
history and nurtured in both the letter and spirit of Confucian orthodoxy could be 
seen to have among its ranks a number of thinkers whose political phi losophy 
seemed to promise transcendence over its own cultural ethos and limitation. Noted 
late medieval figures like Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 ( 1 6 1 9 - 1 6 9 2 ) , Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 
(1610-1695), and Tang Zhen 唐甄 (1630 -1704) could be gathered in what might be 
cal led " the l iberal t r ad i t i on" of Ch ina , beca u s e they c lung to the C o n f u c i a n 
insistence of the subject ' s duty of fearless remonstrance and advocated in their 
Writings various forms of "egalitarianism" l5l]. It is this tradition, in the view of de 
151,1 "Power, Rights, and Duties in Chinese History," reprinted in Chineseness, pp. 165-187. 
’5'1 See Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1983; New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). The thesis of the 
book is briefly rehearsed and re-emphasized in his more recent Asian Values and Human 
lights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
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Bary and other like-minded colleagues, that may even help explain how a certain 
phrase of Confucian rhetoric, first proposed by the then existent Republic of China, 
came to find adoption in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" ratified by 
members of the United Nations in 1948 (52). 
Humane and persuasive as such a line of argument may seem, the problem lies 
in its failure to confront squarely the issue that, although the concept of reciprocity 
in Confucian th ink ing refers to "d i f ferent ia ted but mutual and shared" [531 
obligations, they are for that very reason not equal claims or obligations. De Bary is 
fond of citing the Mencian passage in 3A.4 where different obligations are spelled 
out for different classes of people: e.g. affection between parent and child, rightness 
between ruler and ministers, distinctive duties for spouses, gradation for old and 
young, and trustworthiness between friends 1541. This schematization, unfortunately, 
is always upheld without the concomitant but necessary acknowledgement that even 
these five relations and their idealized obligations themselves embody an inherent 
hierarchical preference. Since our debate involves the consideration of textualized 
tradition and historical reality, we must again refer to the Record of Rites, in which 
the section to "Jitong 祭統(Summary of Sacrificial Principles)" declares that 
In sacrifices are ten relations which may be seen in the way of serving 
the ghosts and spirits, in the obligations between ruler and subject, in 
the relation between father and son, in the ranks dividing the noble and 
the lowly, in the distance separating the kin, in the bestowal of title and 
reward, in the distinction of duties between husband and wife, in the 
impartiality of governmental affairs, in the observance of order between 
old and young, and in the boundaries set between high and low.|55] 
Press, 1998), pp. 158-67. For a detailed critique of this book by de Bary, see my review 
article, "Which Values? Whose Perspective?" Journal of Religion, 80:2 (April 2000), pp. 
299-304. 
[521 See de Barry, "Introduction," in Confucianism and Human Rights, p. 5; Twiss, "A 
Constructive Framework for Discussing Confucianism and Human Rights," in p. 41 and 
note 35; Irene Bloom, "Mencian Confucianism and Human Rights," in Confucianism 
and Human Rights, pp. 96-97. 
1531 de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights, p. 18. 
1541 de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights, pp. 17ff. 
1551 Liji, 26. 11，p. 131. 
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This statement has elicited in turn f rom Fei Xiaotong 費孝通 ( F e i Hsiao-t 'ung, 
1910- )，the fa ther of sociology in modern China , the observat ion that "Lun 
[relations] is order based on classifications" conceived on the very commingling of 
"concrete social relationships" with "abstract positional types [e.g., noble and lowly, 
high and low]." According to him, "the basic character of traditional Chinese social 
structure rests precisely on such hierarchical differentiations. . . . Therefore, the key 
to u n d e r s t a n d i n g n e t w o r k s of h u m a n re l a t ionsh ips is to r e c o g n i z e that such 
distinctions create the very patterns of Chinese social organization." Because "the 
framework of social structure" confuses the symmetric and asymmetric models of 
the socia l and r e m a i n s "unchangeab le" 1 5 6 1 un less the very c a t e g o r i e s fo r its 
construction are dismantled or reconceived, the thesis of contemporary Confucian 
revivalists一that the ideal of moral reciprocity prescribed for those relations would 
p r o v i d e an a d e q u a t e a n a l o g u e to t he c o n c e p t of r i g h t — b e c o m e s h i g h l y 
questionable. 
Since the Confuc ian notion of reciprocity a lways embodies preference and 
priority, it must perforce enjoin unequal sanctions against disparate social ranks in 
the event of legal infraction, a notion directly contradicting the modern Western 
conception of equality before the law. Because humans cannot avoid or escape 
moral fa i lures , the quest ion that Confuc i an i sm must conf ron t is not about the 
necessity to inculcate and practice virtue, or even about the possibility of "self-
renewal (zixin 自新” and "self-correction (gaiguo 改過）” (57]. In the public realm of 
society, it has to do rather with what happens when virtue fails and how will those 
in power be held accountable. Subjects, wives, children, and inquisitive journalists 
may be swiftly penalized if they err, but who will effectively censure, curb, or bring 
t o justice the transgressive emperor, the patriarch, the judge, the senior minister, or 
'5h| From the Soil, The Foundations of Chinese Society, A Translation of Fei Xiaotong's 
Xiangtu Zhongguo 乡郎土中國，with an Introduction and Epilogue by Gary G. Hamilton 
and Wang Zheng (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 66. 
These are the concepts in the traditional Chinese juridical system singled out for praise by • 
Heiner Roetz's thoughtful essay, "Confucianism and Some Questions of Human Rights," 
printed by the Institute Designate of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica 
(July 1999), pp.9-11. Assuredly, Confucian teachings advocate the importance of self-
reform or mending one's behavior in face of mistakes or errors (Analects 1. 8; 15. 30). 
The problem of what to do, however, remains when the supreme ruler does not practice 
such an ideal of self-correction. 
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the members of the ruling party? The question of human rights, in this context, is 
not about mutual kindness, assistance, and cooperation, however noble such acts 
may be in themselves. Rather, it is about the lower and lowest levels of human 
society and what recourse they have and do not have when they are abused and ill-
treated. Must they rely merely on the "fearless remonstrance of loyal ministers" 
that de Bary's books exalt repeatedly? Are exile, imprisonment, or remonstration till 
execution—the three supreme examples of benevolence (ren) in the Shang singled 
our for praise by Confucius in Analects 18. 1—the only viable alternatives when 
rulers and subjects disagree in a contemporary Asian society? 
The ques t ion of how are the rul ing c lasses to be j u d g e d , in fact , f inds an 
illuminating discussion in a well-known passage of Mencius. When a subject fails in 
his duties, according to Confucian doctrine, he may be killed after the ruler has 
made a thorough investigation of the matter (Mencius IB.7). On the other hand, 
even a tyrant as famous as the last king of the Shang could not induce Mencius to 
permit regicide as a general principle. Since, however, Mencius could not alter 
recorded history, his jus t i f ica t ion for kill ing Zhou, the last king of Shang, was 
ingenious: the latter had degraded himself so badly by his immoral despotism that 
he could no longer be c lass i f i ed as king, but mere ly ‘‘a f e l l ow (yi fu 一夫).” 
Hermeneutics had thereby saved both official history and morality, for then Mencius 
could declare resoundingly: "I have heard that a fellow Zhou had been executed, but 
I have not heard that a sovereign had been executed ( IB.8) ." 
History, however, may prove to be more stubbornly intractable than this brilliant 
piece of sophistry. Despite Mencius 's unambiguous and repeated counsel that the 
p e o p l e and the o f f i c i a l s h a v e w h a t s e e m s a r igh t to l e a v e and a b a n d o n an 
unpr inc ip led or evil ruler , thereby dep r iv ing h im of his so-ca l led l eg i t imacy 
(4B. 4) [58), what is recorded in history presents a wholly different picture. In the 
long annals of the Chinese tradition, there has not been a single change of dynastic 
power without violence and bloodshed. On the contrary, even the infra-household 
compet i t ion fo r p o w e r be tween , say, a c rown pr ince and his r ival s ib l ings or 
cousins, more often than not begin and end in the sword, the rope, or the poisonous 
cup. The only accounts of peaceful transmission of rulership are those attributed to 
the reigns of the sage kings, Yao, Shun, and Yu, but their mythic status at the dawn 
1581 De Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights, p. 8. 
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of Chinese history should also warn us that their examples betoken more of Chinese 
desire than veracity. 
This i r re fu tab le p h e n o m e n o n of Ch inese history, I would argue, indicates 
some th ing more than the u n a v o i d a b l e c lash " b e t w e e n ideal va lues and their 
implementation in historical practice" |59], a judgment that smacks more of romantic 
hermeneut ics pervas ive of certain phases of scholarship treating Buddhis t and 
Christian histories than a sound conclusion. In that view, the founding ideals of 
these two t radi t ions are a l legedly so ra re f ied and pure that they were a lmost 
immediately misunderstood by their followers; they can be recovered only by the 
sympathe t ic perspicaci ty of modern interpreters . For me, rather, the basis for 
doubting the Confucian tradition and its modern viability must center on something 
more fundamen ta l : namely, the essent ial ly biological model of the patr iarchal 
family and its use as a luminous mirror of the state that Confucians had extolled 
from the beginning. One may well ask whether the family, even at the level of a 
large, extended household of the clan, can justly reflect the complexity and the 
necessi ty of impersonal arbi t rat ion that must obtain in the poli t ical body of a 
contemporary nation. Can such a family model provide the adequate underpinning 
for the ideals of social equal i ty and minimal human r ights? I suspect not, not 
because the Chinese do not or cannot envision such ideals as desirable ends, as 
some advocates of cultural particularism have erroneously argued, but because the 
mode l i tself long che r i shed and d e f e n d e d by the C o n f u c i a n d i scourse is not 
conducive to the establishment of these ends _ • 
Even in extremely l iberal societies today, famil ies are not thought to be 
organized around a scripted and contracted system of rights but fundamentally by an 
unspoken or loosely specified code of duties, obligations, and expectations that are 
Posited as the proper behavior of kinship. This is the reason why in the US today, 
there is growing vexation, in the courts no less than in social commentary, as to 
w h e n and how the impersonal state should intervene when the fundamental rights of 
citizens as household members are violated or denied by other members of the same 
De Bary,A sian Values and Human Rights, p. 10. 
' ' a recent critique of cultural particularism, see, for example, Bo Yang 柏楊 ( G u o 
Libang 郭立邦)，"Renquan nalai Zhongguo tese 人權那來‘中國特色’ [How could 
human rights have special Chinese character]!" in Central Daily News (overseas edition), 
Monday, February 23’ 1998, p. 5. 
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household 16". By contrast, Confucius and his disciples, as I have tried to show, have 
articulated a meticulously specified code that directly grounds political virtues on 
famil ial ones. The logical quest ion that must be asked at every formulat ion of 
Confucian social and personal ethics is this: what recourse does a Chinese have 
when such prescribed norms are not observed or abused, that is when reciprocity is 
withheld or rejected? Confucius was forthright in answering a disciple's query by 
declaring: "the ruler should employ his subject according to the rules of propriety; 
the subject should serve his ruler with loyalty." But the question the disciple failed 
to bring up next is: what happens when the ruler fails the rules of propriety? As we 
have seen already in the Mencian discussion of tyranny, that ru ler ' s fai lure has 
enormous consequence, because the philosopher recognizes clearly the possibility 
that "Innocent people" could be killed by such a person (Mencius, 4B. 4). Here the 
classic Confucian homology of the state and family breaks down. 
On the one hand, parents and children in any society and at any time may inflict 
on each o the r u n s p e a k a b l e c rue l ty and abuse , but the i r r e l a t i ons w o u l d not 
necessarily dissolve even after such atrocity, nor would they be likely to depose 
parents or disown ancestors in the name of the "Mandate of Heaven." Politics may 
abound in any family, but the biological relations of humans, now even certifiable 
across the centuries by DNA testing (as in the recent case of Thomas Jefferson's 
descendents), are thus not exactly the same as the essentially social nature of state 
governance . On the other hand, therefore , when gove rnmen t and rulers prove 
[6n The Chicago Tribune of Saturday, May 9, 1998, bore the front page, headlined, story of a 
Chinese couple, resident immigrants to the US, who had been threatened by the Cook 
County State's Attorney's office with criminal charge of domestic battery and possible 
deportation for alleged physical abuse of their eight-year old daughter (p. 1). The father 
especially was accused by the state for "hitting his . . . daughter in the face, arms and 
legs" (p. 2) on account of her alleged loss of a ring. Believing that they were merely 
exercising their own right of meting out appropriate discipline for their errant child, the 
parents were bewildered by "the American way." Confronted by both outcries from the 
Asian communities and coverage by the media, the state eventually dropped the 
deportation threat and settled with the family by imposing on the father "a penalty of one 
year of court supervision" and "counseling" (p. 1). However one may interpret this story, 
the events of the episode may well serve as an ironic commentary on the quoted remark 
of Lee Kuang Yew, that "the ruler or the government does not try to provide for a person 
what the family best provides." In pondering possible examples drawn from Chinese 
history, past and present, the issue confronting Mr. Lee is whether "that the family best 
provides" is always the best for the individual member. 
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oppressive and tyrannous, the inevitable remedy must focus on accountability and 
change, preferably by peaceful means. We need to hear again the lesson given at the 
side of Mount Tai 泰山，where Confucius inquired of a grievously weeping woman 
by several graves. Queried by Confucius as to why she did not quit her region after 
her father-in-law, her husband, and her son were all devoured by tigers, she gave 
this decisive reply: "There 's no harsh government here." Whereupon Confucius 
was moved to say to his disciples: "Remember this, little ones. Harsh government is 
worse than tigers!" [62� 
This enlightened insight, alas, yielded no further reflection for possible change 
in the fundamental form of governance, for both Confucius and Mencius could only 
counsel withholding of service or withdrawal f rom the territorial state entirely when 
the ruler was without the dao 道.Even under dire circumstances, the Confucians 
throughout China 's imperial history never bothered to examine whether the state-
family homology could truly withstand scrutiny f rom the perspective of either the 
origin of these two different fo rms of communi ty or the basis of their possible 
dissolution. Because the foundation of the Confucian social order is the teleology of 
the group, the charge, so frequently voiced by academicians committed to Asian 
cultures and values, that the philosophy of human rights promotes individualism 
seems to me a premise begging the crucial point of this modern and still emergent 
Philosophy. As I see the matter, the philosophy of human rights cannot be simply 
interested in "communitarian values," as most contemporary Confucian advocates 
would have it, because those values may not be sufficient substitutes for rights. At 
the level of fundamental principles in social organization and civic governance, a 
community that can be injurious, whether by accident or design, to some members 
of the community hardly qualifies as a desirable community for all. For that reason, 
the bottom line of the theory of human rights must concern itself with individuals, 
indeed in principle with every single human being, because "the justified interests in 
Q u e s t i o n , " as A l a n G e w i r t h h a s a r t i c u l a t e d t he m a t t e r so i n c i s i v e l y , " a r e 
distributively common to all human beings"[631. Before those "interests in question," 
some principles must be established whereby both ruler and commoner would exist 
1621 Liji, 4.45，p. 28. 
'3丨 See "Common Morality and the Community of Rights," in Gene Outka and John P. 
Reeder, Jr., ed., Prospects for a Common Morality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993), p. 34. 
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only as two individuals who may lay equal claim to those interests, and that claim 
should not be jeopardized by any prevenient hierarchical ordering. 
Concluding Reflection 
Since much contemporary discussion of the theories of human rights and the 
Confucian tradition is premised on the alleged conflict between "communitar ian 
va lues" and the Western concern fo r the s ingle person, does it mean that the 
advocacy of any form of human rights must presuppose an understanding of an 
i n d i v i d u a l w h o is " u n a s s a i l a b l e , " " a n a r c h i c , " and o b s e s s e d wi th " r a d i c a l 
autonomy"? Put in the most succinct manner and the bluntest term, is there any 
strand of Confucian thinking that places greater value on the individual, on what 
may properly belong to a single human being—whether life, possession, freedom of 
belief or choice—that the community, whether familial or socio-political, cannot 
alter, coopt, or remove without just cause? The answer to this last question may 
register serious pessimism if one invokes and clings to such form of hierarchical 
authoritarianism as enshrined in the popular, proverbial saying: when a sovereign 
requests a subject to die and he does not, he is disloyal; when a father wants a son to 
perish and he does not, he is unfilial (君教臣死，臣不死不忠；父教子亡，子不亡不 
孝) | M | . On the other hand, there may be hope for mitigating such pessimism if one 
takes into cons ide ra t ion cer ta in s t rands of the C o n f u c i a n d i scour se s ince the 
seventeenth century that began to query received orthodoxy on rulership. If such a 
m ovem en t might not qui te measu re up to a " l iberal t rad i t ion" thus named by 
con temporary scholarship , some Confuc i an eli te did seem to respond to some 
l i b e r a l i z i n g i m p u l s e s , a n d , in h i n d s i g h t , t h e i r i d e a s m i g h t h a v e b e g u n to 
1641 To the best of my knowledge, there is no original source for this proverb, but one 
convenient textual embodiment may be found in Chapter 78 of the novel, Xiyouji 西遊記 
(Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe, 1954). See p. 893 of this edition and also The Journey to the 
West, translated and edited by Anthony C. Yu, 4 vols. (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1977-1984), 4. 43. My citation of this saying does not mean to ignore the 
fact that in the systems of military discipline maintained in even the "liberal, individualist 
West," there is the similar construal of a subject's refusal to die on command as a form of 
treason. What is much more heartening is the development in a place like Taiwan, where 
the dawning consciousness that alternative forms of service may substitute for the 
military draft has found recent legislative enactment. See the Central Daily News 
(overseas edition), January 17, 2000, p. 3. 
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" i n d i v i d u a l i z e (gerenhua 個人化）’，，"privatize (sirenhua 私人化），，，and 
" q u o t i d i a n i z e (riyong changxing hua 曰用常行 f匕）” C o n f u c i a n va lue s and 
practices [65�. Thinkers such as Li Zhi 李贄（1527-1602)，Huang Zongxi, and Gu 
Yanwu 雇頁炎武 (1613-1682 ) not only began an escalat ing ques t ioning of the 
concept of the sovereign as absolute inherited power, but the widening discussion of 
what constituted the public and the private (gong, si 公，私）increasingly focussed 
a t tent ion on the m e a n i n g of the sol i tary p e r s o n ' s mora l wor th a long with its 
obligations 1661. 
In the light of this development, some words of Dai Zhen 戴震 (1723-1777) 
may be regarded as taking on unanticipated significance, as when he declares that 
"one person's desires are the same desires of all persons under Heaven (一人之欲， 
天下人之戶斤同欲)’’ 1671. Taken from Dai's famous expository commentary on certain 
key concepts of Mencius, this statement in its context is merely one expanding on 
the commona l i t y o f o r i g in and s im i l a r i t y o f response in the genesis and 
manifestation of desires as adumbrated in an ancient text like the Record of Music 
(Yueji 樂言己）.Indeed, Dai's expansive discourse on nature, affect/disposition, and 
desire (xing’ qing, yu 性，情，欲)，undeniably creative and synthetic, still appears 
largely as yet another attempt at reconciling the sometime conflictive observations 
Mencius and Xunzi 荀子 with those of Song Neo-Confucians on these venerable 
categories [68]. What is noteworthy is the new object of desire that Dai posits for 
moral disposition and action: 
In human life, there is nothing worse than the 人之生也，莫病于無 
inability to fulfill one 's life. Desiring to fulfill 以 遂 其 生 。 欲 遂 其 
o n e ' s l i fe whi l e a lso f u l f i l l i n g the l ives of 生，亦遂人之生，仁 
others, this is humaneness. Desiring to fulfill 也；欲遂其生，至于狀 
o n e ' s l i fe to the extent of i n ju r ing wi thou t 人之生而不雇頁者，不 
regard the lives of others, this is inhumanity. 仁也。剛 
'W| This is the thesis of Yu Yingshi 余英時，Xiandai ruxue lun 現代儒學論（River Edge, • 
New Jersey: Global Publishing Co., 1996), pp. 1-59. 
1 Yu Yingshi, Xiandai ruxue lun, pp.23-24. 
"‘71 See Mengzi ziyi shuzheng 孟子字義疏證 in Dai Zhen quanji 戴震全集’ 5 vols. (Beijing: 
Qinghua daxue chubanshe, 1991), 5: 152. 
See Mengzi ziyi shuzheng, in Dai Zhen quanji, pp. 176-194. 
^engzi ziyi shuzheng, in Dai Zhen quanji, p. 159. 
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Later (p. 198)，Dai further clarifies the first part of his assertion with the 
formulation: "Humaneness is the virtue of life productive of life [literally, the hard-
to-translate phrase shengsheng has the tautological force of making life alive]. . • . 
When one person fulfills one's own life and infers from this principle to help all 
under Heaven to fulfill their lives, this is humaneness 人者，生生之德也 一人 
遂其生，推之而與天下共遂其生，仁也。” 
The Mencian overtones of Dai 's assertions become audible if we recall the 
famous discussion on competitive desires recorded in Mencius 6A. 10. That ancient 
thinker's acknowledged fondness for both fish and bear 's palm serves on that 
occasion as a pretext for differentiating desires with far weightier consequence. 
Declaring that life and dutifulness are both objects of his desire (yu), Mencius 
proceeds to make the grand claim that he would forsake life because he desires 
dutifulness more. Immediately realizing, however, that such nobility may not be 
common, Mencius attempts valiantly to make universal the virtue of choosing 
virtuously by specifying how one's acceptance of food, an indisputable necessity of 
life, depends on the condition of its provision. If food is given with abuse, according 
to Mencius, "even a traveler would not receive it (行道之人弗愛 ) . ” Such an 
a t t i tude (xin) is a l l eged ly c o m m o n to all (ren jie you zhi 人皆有之）’ but 
immediately, Mencius feels obliged to equivocate: it's just that the worthy person is 
able not to lose it (賢者能勿喪耳 ) . T h i s distinction between attitude and ability, 
unfortunately, revises and limits the intended scope of the Mencian claim. 
In contrast to his master ' s text, what is new in Dai Zhen 's formulation is 
prec ise ly how his v iew of the human condi t ion and the sup reme good of 
humaneness or benevolence (ren) is based on the universality of desire and its 
object without further qualification. For a reader conscious of Western social 
thought, it is diff icult to read the first sentence of Dai 's without noticing its 
remarkable affinity with Aristotelian premises. Just as the Greek philosopher has 
sought to ground his systematic investigation of ethics and politics on "the good 
life," "doing well," and "happiness or well-being" (eu zen, eu prattein, eudaimonia) 
as synonyms for the supreme good that all humans seek (Nicomachian Ethics 
1094b), Dai Zhen's singular notion of "life fulfilment (suisheng)" is no less all-
encompassing a foundation for his claims. The drive to fulfill one's life, let us notice 
here, has nothing to do with human relations, because it is not dictated by kinship 
ties, or occasioned by culturally prescribed social position, or dependent on the 
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sanction by a partic lar community. Because they are common to all humans—from 
the highest ruler to the lowliest peasant—the desire and its object as universals 
possess the condition of equality as both phenomenon and quality. One can no more 
say that only some people have such a desire than asserting that a peasant ought to 
aim at a lesser degree of self-fulfillment than a prime minister. 
Precisely because it is fundamental to humanity as such, the desire's life- and 
thus self-affirming potency perforce must carry with it a negative possibility. Just as 
the quest for one's own well-being and happiness can be undertaken at the expense 
of the other , the dr ive toward l i fe f u l f i l l m e n t can a l so hurt o thers . L ike the 
antecedent Aristotle, who had hardly begun his monumental treatise before he felt 
obliged to mention the notion of self-restraint, Dai Zhen 's remark also immediately 
proceeds to forestall the possible negative consequence of such a desire. By setting 
the reckless injury of another life (qiang ren zhi sheng er bu gu 狀人之生而不雇頁） 
as the limit of this desire, the Chinese thinker, it may plausibly be argued, has put 
his f inger on one crucial issue animat ing the debates of ethics and poli t ics in 
different civilizations down through the ages: how to reconcile the most essential 
values cherished by an individual with those values of other individuals. 
Dai Zhen, to be sure, d id not th ink or wr i te in a vocabulary of rights as 
developed and used in the post-Enlightenment discourse on the subject. No student 
of Chinese history and thought, however, wou ld deny that the concept o f 
humaneness or benevolence (ren) has funct ioned as v i r tua l ly a categorical 
imperative for the history of Confucian thought. I t is to Dai's credit, I believe, that 
his definition of virtue as life productive of life {shengsheng zhi de 生生之《惠）has 
succeeded in injecting new content into the familiar concept of ren. Though Dai's 
notion may be interpreted as having stemmed f rom such a famil iar source as 
Confucius's dictum in Analects 12. 10一"to love someone is to want the person to 
Hve (ai zhi yu qi sheng 愛之欲其生)，，’ Dai's innovation and strength, I would argue, 
lie exactly in detaching the content of ren f rom the altruistic but kinship based 
implications of the Confucian injunction to "love people (ai ren)" scattered in the 
Analects (e.g., 1. 5-6; 12. 22) and in the Mencius (4B. 28) l70]. Dai ' s idea, when 
'The space of this essay precludes a detailed consideration of Zhao Jibin's provocative but 
controversial thesis that the meanings of ren 人 and min 民 are sharply and consistently 
differentiated throughout the Analects. According to him, the former refers only to the 
aristocratic strata of society, whereas the latter term signifies the populace or common 
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coupled with the concept of the desire for self-fulfillment (yu sui qi sheng 欲遂其 
生)’ bears the enormous importance of recognizing, and thereby legitimating with 
greater clarity and force, the reality of self-aff i rmation and thus self- love, self-
interest, and self-preservation. We should remember that already in Mencius 6A. 14’ 
there seems to be the recogni t ion that a pe r son ' s se l f - love is unitary because , 
according to that thinker, there is no self-discrimination of bodily parts. Hardly has 
he finished with this observation, however, when Mencius proceeds to offer his own 
self-contradictory hierarchy of preferences by claiming that "the parts of a person 
differ in value and importance." Thus,"a man who takes care of one finger to the 
detriment of his shoulder and back without realizing his mistake is a muddled man" 
(D. C. Lau 's translation). 
In c o n t r a s t to M e n c i u s a g a i n , Da i Z h e n ' s d e f i n i t i o n of h u m a n e n e s s or 
benevolence as "the virtue of life productive of l ife" avoids precisely this sort of 
inconsistent account of desire. The first verb of the punning binome, shengsheng, 
though acknowledged by Dai to bear the meaning of cosmic procreat ion when 
linked with the consideration of Heaven or Nature (p. 199: zai tian wei qihua zhi 
shengsheng 在天為氣化之生生），hardly refers to mere biological reproduct ion 
when it relates to the human (zai ren). Instead, it has the reflexive sense of making 
or keeping life alive, and thus the definition directly involves the maintenance and 
preservation of life, for self and for others m i . If life productive of life is truly the 
quintessential content of ren, any violation of life through destruction or injury, 
whether on the individual or communal level, is potentially as well as actually a 
people. See Zhao Jibin 趙紀彬，Lunyu xintan 論言吾亲斤探(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 
1959), pp. 1-27. 
1711 The binome, shengsheng, derives from the "Commentary of the Appended Phrases 繫 
辭，” 5 of the Classic of Change. Two lines of the receieved text read: "producing life is 
called change; completing [an] image is called the 'Key'生生之謂易，成象之謂乾.，， 
The parallel construction makes it obvious that the second graph of both sentences must 
be read as nominals, objects of the antecedent verbal graphs "to produce/beget" and "to 
complete." The received text thus puts "greater emphasis on the generative capacity of 
the Way," as Edward Shaughnessy observes in his translation of the Mawangdui version 
of the classic. Instead of a binome, however, that version has only a single sheng, and the 
line's slightly different vocabulary also makes for a different reading: "giving life to 
[something] is called 'the image'生之胃(謂)馬(象).，，See Edward L. Shaughnessy, tr.，I 
Ching: The Classic of Changes (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), pp. 192-193 for text 
and translation, and p. 237 for comment. 
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violation of the supreme ideal. Both the affirmation of the universal desire for self-
fulfillment and the correlative injunction to avoid reckless destruction of other lives 
in quest of the same fulfi l lment thus provide a f irm basis for true egalitarianism. 
Could not such an idea serve also as a seed or seminal motif in developing a 
Confucian understanding of human rights that attends to the irreducible worth and 
dignity of the life of the individual? Could Chinese culture be led to recognize that 
the moral obligation of the state or body politic, no less than that of the individual, 
must be dedicated to "join all [people] under Heaven to fulfill together their lives 
(jw tianxia gong sui qi sheng 與天下共遂其生)，，？ 
Such a f o c u s on the ind iv idua l , let it be empha t i ca l l y s ta ted here , is not 
synonymous with the espousal of individualism, and one should point out that the 
opposition between "individualism" and "communitarian values" so often central 
to the present topic is typically drawn in a manner far too crude to formulate what is 
at stake. To affirm the individual in the sense implied by the concept of universal 
human rights is not necessari ly to a f f i rm individual ism in the sense that one ' s 
f u l f i l l m e n t is p r i v a t i z e d or d e f i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of h is or her c o m m u n a l 
relatedness and participation. Conversely, to aff i rm communitar ian values is not 
necessarily to subscribe to the traditional values of a given community in the sense 
that a person's fulfil lment depends on his or her participation in the community so 
defined. 
Pondered in the light of our contemporary debate on rights, the striking quality 
of Dai ' s words may well be their potential for self-transcending implication and 
application, because in those remarks I cited, the single person and the community 
(‘‘all under Heaven" ) are indissolubly and dialectically related. Although the phrase 
"Under Heaven (tianxia^ in context undoubtedly means the imperial empire, in 
Principle its significance may surely be so developed that it transcends its local or 
national delimitation. "When one person fulfills one 's own life and infers f rom this 
Principle to help all under Heaven to fulfill their lives" ~~does not such a statement 
carry an ideal ge rmina l and ge rmane to honor ing universa l humani ty wi thout 
dismissal or sacrifice of the individual? If one's quest for self-fulfil lment must not 
be carried out to the extent of injuring another who, in principle, is engaging in the 
selfsame quest, does not the community act as a check and limit on the individual 's 
anarchic or an t inomian impu l se? To fash ion a concep t ion of the i nd iv idua l ' s 
mviolable dignity and worth f rom the thought of a Qing philosopher, or, for that 
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matter, f rom any other source, Chinese or otherwise, need not therefore be taken as 
a total r epud ia t ion of the so-ca l led " c o m m u n i t a r i a n va lues . " H o w could one 
disagree with any injunction for those in power to treat subjects and citizens with 
respec t , k indness , and t ru s twor th ines s , as C o n f u c i a n t each ings had done fo r 
millennia? What modern advocates of Confucianism need to realize is that even the 
noble prescription for reciprocity among various social strata is itself conditioned by 
that very unequal stratification. Once the imperial system of governance has been 
dismantled, and the republican revolution of 1911 is an irreversible fact of history, 
the same fate has also been handed to its undergirding system of social organization. 
How could one continue to invoke, for example, the relations between sovereign 
and subjects (jun chen 君臣）as part of the basis for morality and action? Exiled 
f rom the imperial society, Confucian teachings have become, in the poignant phrase 
of Yu Yingshi, "wandering souls (you hun 游云鬼)’，1721. Such spirits may be retained 
in the collective memory of the Chinese people, but they need to embody modified 
content or re-structured substance if they are to address realistically and effectively 
the altered social contexts. 
If not all Confucian values are in principle antithetic or inimical to the modern 
advocacy of h u m a n r ights , it mus t be a c k n o w l e d g e d that that advocacy does 
presuppose a radically different evaluation of the person and the group. From the 
latter perspective, the rulers and the state are no more moral or virtuous than the 
ordinary individual, and this belief directly contradicts the notion, held in large part 
of the Confucian tradition, that the sovereign or the collective governing body, by 
vi r tue of power , mus t be super io r even in moral i ty . The be l ie f , pe rhaps f i rs t 
articulated in Menc ius ' s pointed lesson for Prince Xuan of Qi 齊宣王， that the 
"failure to become a true King is due to a refusal to act, not to an inability to act" 
{Mencius, 1A. 7, translation by D. C. Lau), remains a stubborn legacy. I thus agree 
with Lucian Pye 's criticism of Zhao Fusan, once the vice-president of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, for reversing the insight enshrined in the title of the 
A m e r i c a n t h e o l o g i a n R e i n h o l d N i e b u h r ' s w e l l - k n o w n text , Moral Man and 
Immoral Society, by Zhao 's remark that in China 's cultural tradition, "individuals 
have never been placed above society, and the values of individuals have always 
�72i yu Yingshi, Xiandai ruxue lun, p. 36. 
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been unified with the responsibilities of society" 1731. The question posed by human 
rights and their advocacy concerns precisely what happens when society or its 
governing persons fail in good will and virtue. What recourse does a powerless 
person have, not merely to redress grievance or injustice, but also to protect his or 
her life f rom arbitrary injury, detention, or destruction? What safeguard or limit 
does a society possess that prohibits and prevents the group f rom the abuse of 
power? It is to such quest ions that Reinhold N iebuh r ' s (1892-1971) sagacious 
aphorism holds the greatest relevance: "man 's capacity for justice makes democracy 
possible; but man 's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary" '741. 
On the assumption that leadership may fail on an individual or corporate level, 
the advocacy of rights, of participatory democracy and the rule of law f rom which 
no official is ever exempt, may in principle be taken as a rejection of a notion, long 
cherished by the Chinese, that we should "use people to govern the state (yi ren zhi 
Suo 以人治國）.，，In reply to Zhao Fusan 's contention, we may say that human 
rights, properly articulated and implemented, do not place the individual above 
society so much as at tempt to respect and do jus t ice to the wel l -being of both 
individual and civil society. The advocacy of rights represents, even in minimalist 
expectations, an advocacy for both individual and community forms of safeguard 
that d e r i v e f r o m the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of m o r e v i a b l e and s o u n d l y c o n c e i v e d 
institutions. Those institutions are desirable and necessary because, in a larger 
context, the political question posed by human rights is not even exhausted by the 
Prevention of injustice or the abuse of power. What Dai Zhen might not have 
realized when he wrote those interesting words is a sense一now felt and embraced 
by so many communities global ly—that equal participation in the exercise of 
Political power must be a necessary condition for the fu l l realization of human 
capacities. Democracy, an independent, effective judiciary, and a free press thus not 
See "The State and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation," in Brian Hook, ed., The 
Individual and the State in China (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 20. To be fair to 
Zhao, as Pye recognizes, such generalizations merely echo or repeat similar ideas held by 
someone like Lee Kuan Yew. Furthermore, one can hardly open a newspaper published in 
Taiwan for very long without reading pundits and educators who exalt the students to let 
society educate them. Moral Society and Immoral Man, indeed! 
See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A 
Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defense (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1944)，p. xiii. 
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only protect against the invasion or harm of each individual's fundamental dignity; 
they also enable communal participation constitutive of human fulfi l lment (sui ren 
zhi sheng). It should be quickly added, of course, that better conceptions (theory) or 
even better institutions do not guarantee a more perfect society in the sense of a 
flawless realization of exalted ideals. The advocacy of rights, therefore, ought not to 
be construed as a blind endorsement of existent Western societies and their values. 
Just in the United States alone, the problems stemming from the entrenched racism 
l e a d i n g to u n m i t i g a t e d v i o l e n c e , t h r o u g h c o r p o r a t e g r e e d , c o r r u p t i o n , and 
wastefulness, to bias, sloth, and ignorance that miscarry the law, and to state secrecy 
and duplicity, will form a litany of imperfections that truly shocks and dismays [75]. 
After more than two centuries, the republic that is the United States of America is 
still g rapp l ing dai ly to l ive up to the be t te r idea ls in sc r ibed in its f o u n d i n g 
Constitution. 
I began this study by referring to Professor Wang Gungwu 's appeal to a "shared 
historical experience" of the Chinese to help us understand what Chineseness means 
at any particular moment. A quick glance at part of that shared historical experience 
now may render moot some of the scholarly controvers ies that I have hi therto 
reviewed. For in the world we know today, ancestor worship exists in a much 
reduced scale and scope among most Chinese communities, and the large, clannish 
households for most families are virtually a thing of the past. Nearly a century has 
transpired when China 's last emperor was deposed. Only a so-called "dictatorship of 
the p ro le t a r i a t " r ema ins in the w o r l d ' s mos t p o p u l o u s na t ion , but even that 
government is changing as it s truggles to cope with the imperat ives of change. 
China, I 'm pleased to note, signed the "International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights" on October 5, 1998, although it is reported that it has continued to harass 
and arrest dissenters trying to organize a new political party on the mainland. Its 
recent pract ice of brutal suppress ion of the fo l lowers of Falun Gong may also 
1751 For a recent example of unbridled racism that ends in open killing, see the story on one 
Buford Furrow in Los Angeles, who reported shooting a Filipino-American postal worker 
in cold blood simply on the ground that the latter was "non-white." The report may be 
found in the Chicago Tribune (Friday, August 13，1999)，Sec. 1，p. 3. For a powerful 
critique of certain American values and practices in relations to the consideration of 
human rights, see Henry Rosemont Jr., "Human Rights: A Bill of Worries," in 
Confucianism and Human Rights, pp. 54-66. 
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indicate a tenacious reluctance to accommodate any freedom of thought and belief. 
Whatever of f ic ia l just i f icat ion for its current pol icy and action that the PRC 
government may offer, and however small and insignificant a group the dissenters 
may appear at the moment, they should not lead us to concur with the sentiment that 
China is somehow not yet ready for human rights because of its particular social and 
political condition. Apparently the tens of thousands who congregated in Tiananmen 
Square in 1989 already thought otherwise, and the thousands that have continued to 
assemble and march in Hong Kong in commemoration of June 4 seem also to be of 
the s a m e m i n d and c o n v i c t i o n . D e s p i t e the s k i l l f u l a p o l o g e t i c s f o r A s i a n 
authoritarianism exploited by the likes of Lee Kuan Yew and Mohamad Mahathir, 
the people of South Korea and Taiwan are firmly and steadily implementing a rule 
of law and a comprehens ive part ic ipatory democracy. The surpris ing result of 
Tawian 's March 2000 election, in fact, should give the lie to the content ion of 
culture and regional particularism that somehow, Asian Chinese are not receptive to 
Political and social practices that presume a lofty view of the individual. Ought not 
this kind of "shared historical experience" count, too, in the contemporary debate on 
human rights? Perhaps the time has come when revolutionary changes in the culture 
of p o l i t i c s w i l l o c c u r as s w i f t l y ( t h o u g h p e r h a p s n o t as p a i n l e s s l y a n d 
surreptitiously) as those in the Chinese language with the alphabetization of the 
computer keyboard. 
Let me close by citing Long Yingtai 育I 應台（1952- ), an activist of Taiwan 
who, as a widely read au thor and respec ted cul tural cri t ic , has recent ly been 
appointed to head Taipei's Bureau of Culture. With a doctorate in English f rom the 
University of Kansas, she caused considerable stir in the early eighties by writ ing 
sca th ing c r i t i q u e s of the au toc ra t i c K M T g o v e r n m e n t . She pe r s i s t ed in her 
Publications despite repeated threats of arrest and incarceration, winning eventual 
recogni t ion as one of the h a n d f u l of wr i te rs w h o p layed a m a j o r ro le in the 
liberalization of that island community. Asked to reflect on her experience of the 
Past decade, she ended a recent article with this conclusion: 
O n e w h o has l ived t h r o u g h the e i g h t i e s in T a i w a n has to be an 
individualist through and through: someone who will continue to dream 
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about the dawn while confronting the deepest personal darkness. Never 
blink!'761 
These are the words of enduring change, because they teach us the difficult but 
rewarding lesson that the change that must be endured is the change that endures. 
1761 See “八〇年代這樣走過，” in Zhongguo shibao 中國時報(Wednesday, August 12， 
1998)，p. 37: “走過台灣的八•年代’不能不是一個徹底的個人主義，繼續夢想光 
明’面對個人最深邃的黑暗。不眨眼。” 
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